Iran Guards Build Covert Iraq Cells to Strike Gulf States

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has set up secretive cells inside Iraq to conduct drone strikes on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, marking a tactical shift that deepens Gulf security fears and raises the risk of broader Middle East conflict.

Lead

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has established covert armed cells in southern Iraq and directed them to carry out drone attacks on Gulf Arab states that host American forces, eight Iraqi security and militia sources told Reuters on June 19. Three to four cells — each comprising roughly ten elite Iraqi Shi'ite fighters — launched at least seven drone strikes against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from desert terrain near the cities of Basra and Samawa between April 20 and May 17. The disclosure, the first public account of this new network's operational record, signals a significant escalation in Iranian covert strategy amid what observers describe as deepening regional instability.

What Happened

The new cells operate entirely outside the command structure of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, the umbrella grouping of Iran-aligned militias that has been the primary vehicle for proxy operations in recent years. Instead, the units report directly to the IRGC, an arrangement the sources say was designed specifically to evade the surveillance methods deployed by US and Gulf intelligence services against the established networks.

The seven recorded attacks broke down as three drone strikes targeting Kuwait, two aimed at Saudi Arabia, and two directed at the UAE. Disclosed targets included Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait — where US forces are permanently stationed — and a military terminal at Kuwait International Airport. A separate incident on May 1 involved an alleged incursion onto Kuwait's Bubiyan Island, where a firefight between IRGC-linked troops and Kuwaiti armed forces resulted in the injury of one Kuwaiti soldier and the capture of four of the infiltrators.

Strategic Context

The formation of smaller, more tightly controlled units reflects a recalibration forced on Tehran by cascading setbacks. Iran's Revolutionary Guards and their broader proxy ecosystem have faced significant attrition since Israeli and US military operations accelerated in early 2026, degrading command infrastructure, weapons stockpiles, and the operational capacity of established militia groups. With resources stretched and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq operating under heightened scrutiny, the IRGC turned to smaller, ideologically vetted cells that are harder to monitor and quicker to disavow.

The logic mirrors tactics employed historically across multiple theaters: when a conventional proxy architecture becomes exposed, fragment and decentralize. The new Iraq-based cells represent exactly that — a distributed, deniable strike capability designed to sustain pressure on Gulf neighbors without presenting a clear attribution trail or a static target for retaliation.

Geopolitical Dimension

The attacks arrive against a backdrop of accelerating Gulf security deterioration. Since late February 2026, Iranian forces have threatened shipping through the Strait of Hormuz — a chokepoint handling roughly 20% of the world's daily oil supply — and the IRGC Navy has issued explicit warnings against Gulf energy infrastructure. At least 25 Iranian strikes on commercial and military shipping have been recorded by independent conflict monitors since late February.

US and Iraqi Response

The US State Department publicly demanded that Iraq take immediate steps to dismantle Iranian destabilization tools operating on its territory, naming the IRGC and Iran-aligned militias specifically. In a joint statement, al-Zaidi and US envoy Tom Barrack outlined plans for disarming groups operating outside state control and preventing Iraqi territory from serving as a launch platform for attacks on neighboring states. The practicability of those commitments remains uncertain given the entrenched relationships between elements of Iraq's security apparatus and the very militia networks now under scrutiny.

For Gulf Cooperation Council members, the revelation of a parallel, more opaque IRGC network in Iraq compounds an already demanding threat environment. Military and intelligence services across the region have spent years mapping the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's logistics and personnel; the emergence of an entirely separate, IRGC-controlled layer means those maps are now incomplete.

Energy and Market Implications

Energy markets have registered the accumulating risk. Drone strikes near or at military facilities adjacent to civilian port infrastructure, combined with the Hormuz threat posture, have kept a meaningful geopolitical premium embedded in crude prices throughout the second quarter of 2026. Any escalation that disrupts flows through Kuwait, disrupts Saudi export terminals, or triggers UAE port closures would immediately translate into supply shocks across Asian and European import markets.

Outlook

The IRGC's shift toward leaner, directly commanded Iraqi cells introduces a persistent and difficult-to-neutralize threat to Gulf security. Unless Baghdad can credibly sever the operational ties between the IRGC and these networks — a task complicated by domestic political constraints and the depth of Iranian influence in Iraq's Shi'ite south — Gulf states face the prospect of an ongoing low-intensity drone campaign that tests both their air defenses and their diplomatic channels with Iraq. The pattern points to prolonged regional instability rather than a discrete escalation, making sustained crisis management rather than resolution the most realistic near-term scenario.